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ABSTRACT: Human resource programs that were developed to serve
those displaced by plant closings have been fragmented. Participation rates
have been low in placement, job search assistance, relocation, and retrain-
ing programs, and results have not been particularly positive. Great
emphasis was placed upon serving those in need when programs did
develop. The fragmentation characteristic of previous policy&mdash;or nonpolicy&mdash;
seems to have undergone considerable organization and rationalization
with the advent of the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) and the
association of several major labor-management displaced worker pro-
grams with the federal-state program. This change tends to emphasize
placement and to focus upon training exclusively. As a result, not only will
disadvantaged workers compete with displaced workers for training
resources and jobs, but participation in programs for displaced workers
will be encouraged for those who are most advantaged, thus consigning a
large number of less-advantaged displaced workers to underemployment,
permanent unemployment, and eventual dependence upon income main-
tenance.
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I N the past, when a plant shut down-~L when there was no longer any hope
that concessions or employee buy-outs
could save the jobs-what choices did
displaced industrial workers have? If
they could not retire, they could have
done one of three things; reenter the
labor market directly, relocate, or
retrain. Faced with this same situation
and the same limited choices, what have
human resource programs done? Some-
times they have attempted to assist dis-
placed workers to reenter the labor
market, relocate, or retrain.
What happened as displaced
workers from plant closings and human
resource programs faced the problems
and choices together? Not much.
Why? This article argues that pre-
viously developed programs ignored the
constraints and resources of displaced
workers while workers were either not
informed or ignored information about
the labor market. Decision making on
both sides suffered.
What happened then? Often, more
bad decisions resulted.
Why should all this be reviewed?
Because plants continue to shut down
and workers continue to suffer perma-
nent job loss, as a result of foreign com-
petition, technological change, and
industrial restructuring. Unless adequate
information, support, and resources are
provided and well-informed decision
making can take place, we run the risk of
the permanent disemployment of hun-
dreds of thousands of American workers
even when some jobs are available. We
run the risk of training for jobs that will
never exist or for jobs that will disappear
in a few years. We also run the risk of
attributing the blame for prolonged unem-
ployment to workers for not participat-
ing in programs when in fact they could
not do so. Through this blame, it is also
likely that those workers’ chances in the
labor market will be even further re-
duced.
LABOR MARKET REENTRY
AND JOB SEARCH ASSISTANCE
The plant-closing policy literature
provides an interesting and checkered
pattern of search/ placement programs,
participation levels, and results. A
recent review of nine studies shows that
participation rates in programs provid-
ing placement assistance in plant clos-
ings vary widely, ranging from a 1 per-
cent participation rate in a Fort Worth
closing to a 70 percent rate in the Mack
Truck plant closing.’ In general, when
data are available about participants
and nonparticipants in programs, par-
ticipants are older-39.2 years versus 37
years-and have higher seniority-I 1.3
years versus 10.8 years.
Age has long been known to be a
critical variable for those who are
unemployed. The displaced older
workers are unemployed for a longer
period, have less successful reemploy-
ment experiences, and sometimes fail to
gain new employment at all. Older
workers encounter significant barriers-
both economic and noneconomic-to
relocation, including home ownership
and community attachment. Age is also
a problem for retraining since the eco-
nomic returns for retraining will be
reduced due to limited time at the new
1. Jeanne Prial Gordus, Paul A. Jarley, and
Louis A. Ferman, Plant Closings and Economic
Dislocation (Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Insti-
tute for Employment Research, 1981), p. 79.
2. Michael Aiken, Louis A. Ferman, and
Harold B. Sheppard, Economic Failure, Aliena-
tion, and Extremism (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1968).
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occupation. Noneconomic barriers to
retraining include lower educational
level associated with higher age plus
considerable apprehension about return-
ing to school.
It has been suggested that older
workers have attempted to compensate
for the liability of age by choosing job
search assistance and placement pro-
grams. But, because of the unfavorable
demographics of participants-older,
less educated, fewer skills, more firm- or
plant-specific skills-it is difficult to
assess their success or failure. Early pro-
grams certainly did not appear to help
participants. In the Mack Truck closing,
only 5 percent of the placement pro-
gram’s participants found jobs through
that channel. One study showed that
those who received assistance in job
search had post-program earnings of
$7120 annually compared with $7875
shown by reemployed workers from the
same plant who did not receive job
search assistance.’ Any number of
reasons can be advanced for this result,
including the fact that participants had
lower pre-program wages than nonpar-
ticipants, even though the lower skill
and educational level, combined with
other disadvantages, may actually have
been marketed better by the placement
program than participants could have
managed on their own.
In the 1970s the idea of the job club,
first developed for hard-to-employ
clients, was used for displaced workers.
There is some evidence to suggest that
workers displaced from closings who
participated in the well-known and suc-
cessful Downriver Community Confer-
ence (DCC) Program4 either resisted job
clubs or became too dependent on the
step-by-step process that the Azrin job
club model requires. Job clubs assume
two things. One is low motivation on the
part of participants not only toward job
search but toward work. This assump-
tion of low motivation to search for low-
paying jobs may be accurate for dis-
placed workers; low work motivation is
not characteristic of displaced blue-
collar workers. The other assumption is
that there are jobs. Often the local labor
market in an area with one or more
plant closings simply has a job deficit.
However, when the local labor
market has an adequate stock of jobs
and when job search skills are taught to
displaced workers from a plant closing,
some success can be shown. During the
first phase of the DCC Program,’ 56
percent of those who participated in the
job search training, which was required
of all participants, were reemployed.
If the sparse data we have provide
any indications about successful versus
unsuccessful job search approaches, it is
that plant closing workers lack informa-
tion about themselves and the labor
market. Programs designed to increase
their information and their job search
skills do succeed when jobs exist. This
suggests that plant closing workers do
engage in a cost-benefit analysis, just as
theory indicates job searchers do.
Workers from plant closings will resist
costly job search/retraining/relocation
efforts in favor of those with lower costs.
3. Gordus, Jarley, and Ferman, Plant Closings
and Economic Dislocation, pp. 80-82.
4. Jane Kulik et al., Reemploying Displaced
Workers: The Implementation of the Downriver
Community Conference Economic Readjustment
Program (Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates,
1982), pp. 9-11.
5. Ibid., pp. 9, 23-27.
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If one indisputable fact has emerged
from research about plant shutdowns, it
is that workers prefer to reenter the
labor market close to home and that
they will resist other higher-cost options
until it is clear that no success at local
job search will result for them.
RELOCATION AND
RELOCATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
Relocation assistance can be availa-
ble in two general forms after a plant
closing. In some cases there are collec-
tively bargained rights of transfer. There
have been public programs as well,
including the Trade Adjustment Assis-
tance (TAA) provisions.
We have some interesting evidence
showing that when both blue-collar and
white-collar workers are displaced by a
plant closing, white-collar workers have
very different job search behavior than
blue-collar workers. White-collar
workers will begin job search very early
and they will relocate for new jobs.6 6
These two characteristics may actually
be related. The perceived failure of the
early job search may very well be the
impetus for a decision to relocate. This
point may have relevance for blue-collar
plant closing workers’ decision making,
since their later job search, undertaken
when the labor market is already unable
to absorb the results of the closure, may
coincide with the end of unemployment
benefits. Relocation might be chosen as
the only available course at that time,
and that type of uncommitted reloca-
tion followed by a return is a consistent
feature of the plant closing relocation
literature.
A recent review of four relocation
studies provides most of the available
information about collectively bargained
transfer programs.’ The studies cover a
variety of plant closings, including auto,
steel, rubber, glass, oil, truck manufac-
turing, meat packing, and food process-
ing. In the truck-plant situation, man-
agement did not wish to facilitate
transfer and through a variety of obstruc-
tive techniques reduced incentive to relo-
cate. The strategy met with some suc-
cess, and 10 percent chose to relocate.
Despite management’s attempt to reduce
relocation, that 10 percent rate is not
very low in comparison with others. In
another case, where a provision allowed
workers to move to the new location to
try it out and then choose to stay or to
accept termination, with severance
pay-a policy planned to facilitate a
good decision-the relocation rate was
17 percent.
The best collectively bargained relo-
cation provision described in the litera-
ture included the retention of seniority
rights at the new location. Retention of
seniority in a relocation is an important
benefit to workers, and the result of this
transfer policy was the highest reloca-
tion rate in the literature, 22.7 percent.
This policy was also costly, since moving
expenses and one week’s pay were also
provided.
Even transfers, moves to an assured
job with a known income, often result in
a return home. In cases in which
workers could relocate temporarily and
return with no loss of severance, 15-20
percent returned. Even the transfer pol-
icy that protected seniority did not hold
all the workers at the new site. In that
case 25 percent moved back to the old
6. Gordus, Jarley, and Ferman, Plant Closings
and Economic Dislocation, pp. 104-7. 7. Ibid., pp. 104-17.
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location. Relocation, it must be noted, is
highly correlated with wage gains. One
study showed, for example, that reloca-
tors had an income gain of $3093 com-
pared with those who chose to reenter
the local labor market. Of course, local
labor market entrants may have closed
the wage gap after gaining some expe-
rience in the new job or occupation.
Relocation is chosen, as one writer
has noted,’ mostly by those who do not
need to move. Comparative youth,
comparatively high skill level, and
comparatively high educational level
are all associated with relocation. On
average, the younger, more highly
skilled, and better-educated have a bet-
ter chance in any labor market. It is
important to stress that the low reloca-
tion rates cited here are associated with
assured and relatively comparable jobs.
The effect of this assured job for the
plant closing worker making the deci-
sion is to reduce uncertainty. The
worker, in such cases, knows the
benefit-the wage at the new location-
against which to balance the economic
and noneconomic costs of the move,
something not available to those who
relocate and then search for work.
A further point needs comment.
Most of these studies were done in peri-
ods when the two-wage household was
not as common as it is now. Early
studies show that women almost never
relocated, especially married women,
since they were usually secondary wage
earners and such a move was not often
reasonable. The two-wage household is
yet another disincentive for relocation
as a maj or plant closing policy.
Public policy developed to facilitate
relocation has not been particularly suc-
cessful, as one might predict. Some
emphasis on relocation was developed
during the Trade Adjustment Assist-
ance (TAA) programming available to
workers from trade-impacted industries.
However, many of these workers were
laid off as a result of massive layoffs and
partial closures, and many, estimated to
be between 70 and 80 percent, actually
returned to the original employer.9 It is
not surprising therefore that less than 6
percent of TAA participants elected to
relocate with the moving expenses and
other assistance available through that
program.’° More recently, we find the
relocation component of DCC provid-
ing a carefully designed and well-
implemented program to help those
who wish to move after an initial trip to
search for a job. After a job offer that
meets the TAA guidelines-providing
80 percent of the former wage-is made,
a lump sum for start-up costs, moving
expenses for the family, transportation,
and per diem were provided. Still, from
August 1980 until the end of September
1981-DCC’s first phase-52 partici-
pants, or 8 percent of the total enroll-
ment, relocated. Of these, about 10-15
percent have returned.&dquo;
It is clear that, as a human resource
policy, relocation works best-if it
works at all-when it is collectively bar-
gained. In that case, a major problem-
uncertainty-is reduced, while the costs
are often reduced by moving-expense
reimbursement. Moreover, the benefits-
the wage at the new site-are known.
Yet, even in this case, when the costs and
8. Ibid., p. 97.
9. Martin S. Feldstein, "Temporary Layoffs
in the Theory of Unemployment," Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 84:937-57 (1976).
10. Walter Corson et al., Survey of Trade
Adjustment Assistance Recipients (Princeton, NJ:
Mathematica Policy Research, 1979).
11. Kulik et al., Reemploying Displaced
Workers, pp. 27-32.
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benefits are known, and uncertainties
reduced, relocation is consistently re-
jected. Fortunately, public policy has
moved away from relocation as a human
resource strategy. Whether or not the
direction chosen is more productive
remains to be seen.
RETRAINING AND
RETRAINING ASSISTANCE
At the present time, public policy
emphasizes retraining as the primary, if
not the sole, solution to the problem of
structural unemployment, including
plant closings. Retraining, of course,
simply represents another type of mobil-
ity. While those who relocate move geo-
graphically to obtain employment,
those who retrain change occupations
from declining sectors to growing occu-
pations. Some theoretical formulations
support retraining as an adjustment
measure. The assumptions underlying
such an approach include the idea that
workers from plant closings may exhibit
skill shortages that make them ill
equipped for new jobs requiring differ-
ent skills. Neither side of this assump-
tion has been either proved or disproved.
However, research currently in pro-
gress’2 has already provided evidence
that one category of workers, displaced
due both to plant closings and to layoffs,
are not particularly short of skills in
areas where jobs are expected to be.
Recent estimates from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) for jobs to be
created by 1990 give the occupations
specified in Table 1 as the sources of
most new j jobs.
Only three of these jobs-nursing,
teaching, and truck driving-require
any retraining. Certification demands
some training for truck drivers, while
nursing occupations require a serious
and prolonged retraining effort. Many
of these jobs, notably teaching, will not
be available for several years. Still, one
might reasonably argue that many jobs
not yet created or imagined might arise
and require skilled workers. However,
without some idea of the content of
these jobs, training programs cannot be
designed except in the most general
terms, with components that are broad
based and flexible, such as mathemati-
cal and computer skills.
These microlevel concerns are often
dismissed, since the idea of human capi-
tal is actually a macrolevel concept.
Originally developed as a residual
explanation for a rate of growth in the
American economy that grew after
World War II at a faster rate than capi-
tal inputs could explain, human capital
explanations fared well when the returns
to investment on education were higher
than other returns on invested capital.
That rate of return is now lower, but the
idea still drives much program devel-
opment. While it is true that private
industry spends considerable funds for
training, the level has been relatively low
overall, totaling about 10 percent of the
amount set aside for capital expen-
ditures.13
What is the record of retraining
efforts associated with plant closings?
As with other plant closing interven-
12. Jeanne Prial Gordus et al., Labor Force
Status, Program Participation, and Economic
Adjustment of Displaced Auto Workers, Univer-
sity of Michigan Displaced Auto Worker Study
Report no. 3 (Ann Arbor, MI: Institute of Science
and Technology, 1984).
13. Pat Choate, Retooling the American Work
Force: Issues and Federal Options (Washington,
DC: Northeast-Midwest Institute, 1982).
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TABLE 1
TEN OCCUPATIONS WITH LARGEST JOB GROWTH, 1982-95
SOURCE : George T. Silvestri, John M. Lukasiewicz, and Marcus E. Einstein, &dquo;Occupational
Employment Projection through 1955,&dquo; Monthly Labor Review, 106(11):45 (Nov. 1983).
NOTE: Includes only detailed occupations with 1982 employment of 25,000 or more. Data
for 1995 is based on moderate-trend projections.
tions, the data are not extensive, nor do
they support close analysis. In general,
the record has not been particularly
encouraging. In an analysis of published
literature on retraining programs to
assist with plant closing displacement, it
was noted that participation was low,
ranging from 6 percent of the eligible
workers at one site to 16.4 percent of
those eligible at the plant closing site
with the highest participation rate. 14
Only the most general remarks can be
made about these early retraining
efforts. Women enrolled in dispropor-
tionate numbers. There are several plau-
sible explanations for this, including the
fact that women in two-worker house-
holds probably had lower opportunity
costs for retraining while other options,
such as relocation, were obviously less
attractive to them than occupational
mobility.
It is important to note that the
retraining literature also shows that
retrainees do not have post-program
wage rates as high as their earlier wage
rates. Again, there are many explana-
tions for that, but besides the obvious
switch from high seniority, with high
value placed upon firm-specific skills, to
entry-level positions, there is a possible
connection between the high rate of
female participation in retraining and
low wages. If retraining programs were
developed for the lower-paying service
occupations, men may have continued
to decline to participate while women
screened themselves into programs with
placements in occupational areas with
lower wages.
The BLS data shown in Table 1 seem,
on the surface, to predict jobs that are
low paying, in the service area, and tra-
ditionally associated with women.
However, as we know, workers from
plant closings tend to be chiefly male.
More recent programs have not yet
been evaluated, although some analysis
14. Gordus, Jarley, and Ferman, Plant Closings
and Economic Dislocation, pp. 104-7.
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has been completed for some programs.
In Table 2 we present some information
about 14 examples of small and large
programs featuring retraining, job
counseling, and placement activities.
These examples of displaced-worker
training programs, although many are
still in progress and others are com-
pleted but not thoroughly evaluated,
provide some information important
for policy development. Programs that
are closely geared to the requirements of
the local labor market do well. In
Bridgeport, in Des Moines, at the
Downriver Community Conference,
when displaced workers are trained for
jobs that currently exist-and when that
training is designed to relieve employers
of training costs-the outcomes are
good.
The implications of that predictable
result are several. First, there must be
jobs for which people are to be trained
and there must be information about
those jobs. Clearly, retraining programs
are geared to labor markets with some
opportunities, a situation that does not
prevail in many areas of the country
where plant closings continue.
A second implication is that when
retraining is chosen as a major empha-
sis, and when post-training placement
rates are important, choices about the
most trainable participants are made. It
is not clear, however, that even a major-
ity of plant closing workers would be
assessed as good material for retraining
programs.
A third implication of the informa-
tion presented in Table 2 is that pro-
grams that work cost money. Since
resources are inadequate-although
$3.7 billion is authorized for the Job
Training Partnership Act, only $0.1 bil-
lion is specifically for displaced-worker
programs-and displaced workers are
plentiful-estimates range from hun-
dreds of thousands to more than 2
million-there is a distinct mismatch
between the funds available for retrain-
ing and the numbers to be served. The
implication of that is equally clear; par-
ticipation rates may not need to be
increased in general, but participation
of some will be encouraged while the
retraining of others will not.
PARTICIPATION,
NONPARTICIPATION, AND
THE NEW TRAINING INITIATIVE
We have discussed participation exten-
sively in this article, to the point at
which it may seem as though participa-
tion has been the sole evaluative criter-
ion. In fact, that is very nearly true, for
we have few data about most retraining
programs that have occurred in the past
besides participation rates. However,
since retraining has become the major, if
not the sole, public policy response to
plant closings and massive layoffs, place-
ment rates will take on critical impor-
tance and will change the emphasis
upon participation from how many par-
ticipate to who the participants are.
In the past, blue-collar workers from
plant closings have had virtually no
mobility in their working lives. Apart
from the indefinite layoff and the recall,
most industrial workers have been
rewarded for endurance and have
sought stability within a relatively nar-
row job structure. Termination, even by
the obviously permanent plant closing,
often elicits a passivity that needs to be
understood within the context of a work
history that has rewarded workers for
relinquishing their career development
planning to others. This passivity is a
perfectly reasonable response consider-










































































































labor markets and benefits are provided
to sustain income until other jobs sur-
face that have the same characteristics
and that reward the same attributes.
Passivity, however, is obviously no
longer appropriate.
In the past, most plant closing pro-
grams accepted the sorting of partici-
pants that the labor market provided.
The result was, as the literature suggests,
that those who could not or did not
reenter the labor market directly and
easily sought assistance through pro-
grams. Thus participation in retraining
most often drew those who had a need
for some assistance, those with lower-
than-average pre-closing wage rates and
those with no opportunity to relocate
and with low wage expectations, such as
displaced women workers.
The current situation, in contrast,
puts pressure upon providers, including
those labor-management programs that
are partly funded by government
moneys, to recruit those who would not
have participated in the past, namely,
those better advantaged, all other things
being equal, to find employment on
their own. Such careful selection-and
often limited selection as well-is not
new to employment and training. How-
ever, it will become more critical as pro-
gram refunding depends upon place-
ment in a labor market where oppor-
tunity appears to have constricted con-
siderably. Generally, it can be expected
that participants in new training pro-
grams will be younger, with higher levels
of skills-although probably not skilled
workers per se, who will still have con-
siderable opportunity-and with a
higher level of educational attainment.
This type of participation is precisely
what theory would suggest as appro-
priate, for training costs will be lower
due to higher levels of educability, and
the investment will have a longer period
to provide benefits to retrained workers
and to the economy at large.
Once again, in contrast to the past,
nonparticipants will be those who are
less advantaged to begin with and for
whom no other possibilities are likely.
This new sorting process, which appears
to be an inevitable result of the new
program designs and objectives of
retraining, has very serious implications
indeed. For example, the absence of sti-
pends attached to retraining means that
those whose unemployment insurance
benefits have been exhausted can retrain
only at their own expense, using savings,
the earnings of other family members,
and/ or the proceeds of full-time or part-
time work. Very often, it is the older
worker-less advantaged from some per-
spectives and often a poor investment
bet for retraining-who has savings and
a working spouse-often a wife whose
homemaking responsibilities have been
reduced as children have grown-who
can take advantage of retraining, since
some funds are available. The younger
workers, those whose trainability and
good prospects for placement and ex-
pected return on investment, originally
sorted into retraining, will have fewer
financial resources and will not be able
to retrain.
Retraining programs therefore risk
serving a small group whose personal
and financial resources are extensive-
those who, research has shown, do well
without program participation. Program
participation will not be possible for
those with limited personal and/or
financial resources who might have
benefited. Thus scarce funds may be
targeted to help those who need less help
and may result in a less productive use of
those funds than another strategy might
permit.
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Other workers may be denied assis-
tance because of local political consid-
erations. It will be very difficult for local
officials to move quickly to assist
workers in a shutdown at an early stage
when previous closings have left others
unemployed. Those from earlier closings
will have already exhausted their unem-
ployment benefits. They will therefore
have to work, leaving no time for
retraining and thus creating a serious
inequity.
A major concern voiced by leaders of
minority groups has been the shift of
funds and attention from the disadvan-
taged unemployed-who have never
had a strong labor force attachment-to
the displaced unemployed who have,
until the layoff, been at a comparative
advantage. Such a scenario would
unfold with even fewer of the disadvan-
taged gaining training and subsequent
employment since limited funds and
contracting labor market opportunities
will be won by displaced workers and
lost to disadvantaged, hard-to-employ
individuals. The result would be an
enlargement of the permanent under-
class.
Another scenario is beginning to
unfold as well, this time within the ranks
of the displaced workers from plant
closings and massive layoffs. That is the
possibility of competition among the
displaced workers for the relatively few
retraining and employment opportuni-
ties available, with the emergence of rel-
atively few winners. Displaced workers
from two of the major automobile firms
are more likely to be winners because
additional resources can be deployed for
a range of educational opportunities
and programs not available to other
displaced workers. Women will fall into
two groups. Those who are secondary
wage earners may be advantaged by
retraining, especially since many jobs in
growth occupations are traditionally
held by females. Single women with
dependents and one income will be
seriously disadvantaged.
In general, the winners will be those
who are highly trainable and who also
have either short durations of unem-
ployment and continuing benefits or a
high level of personal resources-in
short those most likely to have relatively
positive outcomes without assistance.
The losers will be all the others, those
whose plant closings occurred before
retraining opportunities were available,
those who are expected, because of age
or education level, to be less likely can-
didates for high-level skill training, and
those who have a high level of need for
some type of plant closing assistance.
From one viewpoint, this new restrictive
policy may be convenient-though
callous-since, without good labor
market information and a high level of
relevant skill training, only a few can be
served, and the chances that these few
can be placed are improved.
The human resource implications of
plant closings have never been positive.
Earnings losses, family and personal
disruption, low levels of program partic-
ipation, uneven levels of program effec-
tiveness, and a patchwork set of re-
sponses have characterized the people,
programs, and policies associated with
plant shutdowns. But the external con-
text has changed, making reemploy-
ment at even 50-60 percent of the former
wage rate difficult for displaced indus-
trial workers, even with some assistance.
As the industrial structure has changed,
public policy has also changed, moving
from a patchwork response to an emerg-
ing consensus that retraining is the solu-
tion. Whether the basis of this consensus
is a conviction that investment in human
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capital must pay off; whether it is
founded on a conviction that displaced
American workers, in the face of no
compelling evidence, really do lack
skills for emerging occupations requir-
ing skills; or whether retraining looks
like a good strategy because it buys time
when there are not many jobs available
anywhere is not clear. It is probably a
combination of all of these.
However, the specific form taken by
this new policy initiative has constraints.
It focuses upon retraining and provides
no stipends during retraining, thus
selecting for the newly unemployed or
the relatively highly advantaged dis-
placed industrial worker. It has no other
components to serve the needs of those
who either do not select or are not
selected for retraining programs. It sub-
stitutes the desire for programs with
high placement levels for the operation
of the labor market. Previously those
who participated in programs were
those in greater need since their job search
efforts had not been rewarded and they
turned to programs for assistance in
reemployment and retraining. Now it is
likely that those who need programs the
least but who are most likely to contrib-
ute to those high placement rates will be
chosen and, depending upon their per-
sonal resources and/or their willingness
to retrain while working at survival jobs
and / or their relatively recent unemploy-
ment, an even smaller number will actu-
ally retrain.
It is highly probable that many dis-
placed industrial workers will, in this
new era, fare worse than they would
have at earlier periods, in part because
of the external environment but also as a
result of public policy that is clearly
designed to provide advantages to those
already advantaged. Ultimately, a larger
group of permanently unemployed will
result. These individuals will be blamed
for their unemployment since they did
not participate in the retraining pro-
grams that were supposedly available.
Considerable evidence has been devel-
oped to show that those who attribute
responsibility for their unemployment
to themselves and responsibility for
reemployment to agencies outside them-
selves have the least success in job
search.&dquo; Agencies providing programs
must either serve those most likely to
succeed or risk failure; so those agen-
cies, by avoiding failure and the blame
for failure, help shift the blame to dis-
placed workers.
CONCLUSION
When a plant shuts down, what choices
will the displaced workers have? If they
cannot retire, they will choose to retrain
very rapidly or take their chances with-
out retraining in the local labor market
or elsewhere.
What will human resource-programs
do? Those programs will move rapidly
to recruit the most trainable and the
most reemployable individuals from the
closing plant, so that retraining can take
place while unemployment benefits are
still available to retrainees.
What will happen under these cir-
cumstances ? A very small proportion of
the workers will actually take retraining
and, depending upon the local labor
market and the quality of the program,
these few workers and some programs
will be successful, but at the expense of
the majority of the displaced workers.
Why? Our public policy has moved
from a posture that disregarded the
15. Paul J. Andrisani, "Internal-External Atti-
tudes, Personal Initiative, and the Labor Market
Experience of Black and White Men," Journal of
Human Resources, 12:308-28 (Summer 1977).
79
human resource problems associated
with plant closings. It either passively
permitted or actively assisted a patch-
work set of responses that served those
who could not become reemployed easily
through their own efforts. The new pol-
icy initiative attempts to draw these
patchwork responses together and to
promote, through a variety of institu-
tions, retraining as the solution to this
problem.
Since displaced workers are numer-
ous and resource limitations have been
imposed, selective recruitment for re-
training is inevitable and replaces the
operation of the labor market, which
was the mechanism for program selec-
tion until recently. In the past, those
whose protracted unemployment indi-
cated that their chances in the labor
market were poor selected themselves
for program participation. Now, those
individuals will probably suffer con-
tinued unemployment at best, and per-
manent unemployment is a real possibil-
ity for many of them.
What will be the result of this policy?
Ultimately, the costs associated with
this permanent unemployment and
underemployment will be borne by the
displaced workers and by the taxpayers.
Continued deterioration of physical and
mental health of these individuals and
their families will, without the interven-
tion of a more equitable and enlightened
policy, place enormous burdens upon
publicly funded medical care programs
and upon income maintenance pro-
grams.
It is absolutely essential that both
public and private costs associated with
closings, as well as public and private
benefits, be calculated and that an ade-
quate share of these adjustment costs be
borne by a combination of public and
private sources. No one blanket policy
will work in every instance. A variety of
remedies are available, including shared
work, reduced work weeks, phased
shutdowns-all of which permit early
job search and retraining. Assistance
should be targeted to those who need it
as well as to those who will succeed.
Retraining can function at various levels,
including the very basic reading, writing
and computational skills needed by
some workers as retraining for new jobs
that require such skills, unnecessary in
the old jobs. Protracted job search assis-
tance and extensive job development is
essential, and subsidies to employers
who will provide ultimately profitable
on-the-job training can be powerful
incentives to hire some-though not a
great many-displaced workers. For
those-especially older workers-with
good severance settlements and other
lump-sum payments, programs can be
established to help them-with or with-
out collaboration from other displaced
workers-to set up small business
enterprises.
It is clear that little good information
was developed from earlier plant closing
interventions, and it is possible that this
small amount of poor information has
led to the development of a policy
toward the human resource problems of
plant shutdowns that is arguably worse
than the earlier nonpolicy. Despite the
difficulties, it is important that the
results of this new restrictive and selec-
tive policy be studied closely so that its
real costs in terms of permanent unem-
ployment, underemployment, and asso-
ciated personal disruptions are made
very clear. Such information will be crit-
ical when it is finally possible to develop
programs and policies to take serious
steps toward reducing the problems
associated with industrial restructuring.
